

## Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-09

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 114307

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, PK

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S LUNCHEON WITH PAKISTANI  
AMBASSADOR YAQUB

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR YAQUB HAD LUNCH AT DEPARTMENT ON  
MAY 13 AT INVITATION OF DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL. YAQUB  
STATED THAT BHUTTO IS DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE COURSE OF  
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH INDIA. WHILE HOPEFUL OF SUCCESS  
IN THE FORTHCOMING CIVIL AVIATION TALKS, THE GOP WOULD  
PERSIST IN THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS EVEN THOUGH THESE  
NEGOTIATIONS FAILED. YAQUB NOTED THAT RELATIONS WITH  
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AFGHANISTAN WERE POOR BUT THAT THE GOP WOULD PURSUE A POLICY  
OF RESTRAINT TOWARD KABUL. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER AFGHAN  
ATTEMPTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE BALUCHISTAN AND PUSHTUNIS-  
TAN ISSUES AND SPECULATED THAT INDIA MIGHT SUPPORT THESE

EFFORTS IF NEW DELHI REGAINED A SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO INHIBIT SUCH A POSSIBILITY, PAKISTAN WOULD PRESS ITS CASE FOR ONE OF THE NONPERMANENT SEATS. YAQUB ASSURED INGERSOLL THAT BHUTTO AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE WERE AWARE OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ARMS REQUESTS FROM PAKISTAN. ISLAMABAD WOULD THEREFORE KEEP ITS INITIAL REQUEST MODEST AND FOCUSED ON DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. HE REVIEWED POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION INVOLVING THE BANNING OF THE NAP AND NOTED THAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS PERSIST FOR

BHUTTO. YAQUB SPUN OUT A SCENARIO LEADING TO A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE SUBCONTINENT AND SPECULATED THAT THE FOCUS OF WORLD AFFAIRS MIGHT SHIFT TO THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. DEP ASST SEC DUBS ALSO ATTENDED LUNCHEON. END SUMMARY.

2. INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS. AMBASSADOR YAQUB NOTED THAT CIVIL AVIATION TALKS WOULD BEGIN ON MAY 15. WHILE HOPEFUL OF SUCCESS, YAQUB NOTED THE TALKS WERE COMPLICATED BY PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE HIJACKING OF AN INDIAN AIRCRAFT IN 1971. THE GOP WOULD PERSIST IN ITS EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS EVEN IF THE SCHEDULED CIVIL AVIATION TALKS SHOULD FAIL. IF THE FORTHCOMING TALKS ARE SUCCESSFUL, THIS WOULD "EXHAUST" THE SIMLA AGENDA AND OPEN THE WAY TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AN ACT WHICH THE GOI HAS RESISTED UP TO NOW. THE INTENT OF BHUTTO TO PURSUE THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WAS REFLECTED CONCRETELY IN HIS DECISION TO PROCEED WITH TALKS WITH INDIA ON SHIPPING AND COMMERCE PROBLEMS SHORTLY AFTER NEW DELHI SOUGHT TO RESOLVE THE KASHMIR ISSUE UNILATERALLY BY APPOINTING SHEIKH ABDULLAH AS CHIEF MINISTER OF KASHMIR. ALTHOUGH THIS MOVE PRESENTED INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR BHUTTO, HE NEVERTHELESS DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THESE PARTICULAR NEGOTIATIONS. BHUTTO BELIEVED THAT CANCELLING THE SCHEDULED TALKS WOULD PROVIDE INDIA WITH A PRETEXT FOR ALLEGING THAT THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO BY THE U.S. HAD MADE BHUTTO MORE INTRANSIGENT WITH RESPECT TO NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH INDIA. AMBASSADOR YAQUB  
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COMMENTED THAT IT WAS INDIA'S OBJECTIVE TO DOMINATE PAKISTAN POLITICALLY BUT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ISLAMABAD, WHICH DID NOT WANT NEW DELHI, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO DICTATE WHO ISLAMABAD'S ALLIES AND FRIENDS WOULD BE.

3. PAKISTAN'S REQUEST FOR ARMS. INGERSOLL SAID IT WAS OUR CONTINUING BELIEF THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO WAS THE CORRECT ONE. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR YAQUB SAID THAT BHUTTO AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE GOP'S INITIAL REQUEST TO PURCHASE ARMS FROM THE U.S. FOLLOWING THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WOULD BE MODEST, CAREFULLY PHASED, AND FOCUS ON DEFENSIVE ITEMS. THEY REALIZED THAT AN IMPRUDENT

REQUEST, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL AND U.S. PUBLIC CONCERN, WOULD PLACE THE USG IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND BE SELF-DEFEATING IN TERMS OF PAKISTAN'S OWN OBJECTIVES.

4. PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS. QUERIED ABOUT THE STATE OF RELATIONS WITH KABUL, AMBASSADOR YAQUB SAID THEY WERE NOT GOOD. IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN'S INTENT TO PURSUE A POLICY OF RESTRAINT TOWARD AFGHANISTAN BASED ON

THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. PAKISTAN WOULD PERSIST IN THIS POLICY EVEN THOUGH KABUL WAS PRESSING ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE, PERHAPS ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIETS. KABUL HAS AS YET NOT ACCEPTED THE DURAND LINE DELIMITING THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER. NEVERTHELESS, AFGHANISTAN PRESENTS NO REAL SECURITY THREAT TO PAKISTAN, WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE EFFORTS AT NORMALIZATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, IRAN WAS PLAYING A HELPFUL ROLE.

5. NONPERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT. ALTHOUGH HE WOULD BE PURSUING THIS QUESTION WITH UNDER SECRETARY SISCO LATER IN THE WEEK, YAQUB WISHED TO NOTE HIS PERSONAL CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT INDIA WOULD AGAIN OCCUPY A SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. GIVEN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, THE AMBASSADOR FELT THAT THE INDIANS WOULD LIKELY AID AND ABET AFGHANISTAN IN ATTEMPTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE BALUCHISTAN AND PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUES. ISLAMABAD HOPED TO AVOID THIS POSSIBILITY BY CONTENDING THAT PAKISTAN RATHER THAN INDIA DESERVED A CONFIDENTIAL

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SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT AT THIS TIME.

6. PAKISTAN PRESS REACTION TO EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. YAQUB SAID THAT THE GOP HAD REACTED QUICKLY TO AMBASSADOR BYROADE'S REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING CRITICAL TREATMENT OF THE U.S. IN THE PAKISTANI PRESS FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA. AMBASSADOR YAQUB STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD CALLED IN EDITORS OF PAKISTANI NEWSPAPERS TO TELL THEM THAT THE "PUNGENT" COMMENTS ABOUT THE U.S. WERE UNNECESSARY AND UNCALLED FOR. THE EDITORS WERE FURTHER TOLD THAT THE U.S. WAS AN ALLY AND THAT THIS WAS NO TIME TO BRUISE U.S. SENSITIVITIES OR TO POUR SALT INTO U.S. WOUNDS. INGERSOLL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE GOP'S RESPONSE.

7. INTERNAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN, AMBASSADOR YAQUB SAID THAT NO SATISFACTORY SOLUTION HAD BEEN FOUND AS YET TO POLITICAL TROUBLES IN BALUCHISTAN AND THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION OF MINISTER SHERPAO. A NEW GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FORMED IN THE NWFP BUT PROBLEMS REMAINED. THE BANNING OF THE NATIONAL AWAMI

PARTY IS NOW BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT. THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION. IF THE COURT DECIDED THAT THE BANNING OF THE NAP WAS ILLEGAL, THEN BHUTTO WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE TO SEEK A RECONCILIATION WITH THE NAP AND ITS LEADERSHIP. IF, HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT NAP POLITICAL FIGURES HAD BEEN GUILTY OF SUBVERSIVE

ACTIVITIES, ABETTED BY KABUL, THEN ACTIVITIES OF THE NAP WOULD NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO BE BANNED. UNDER THE LATTER OUTCOME POLITICAL PROBLEMS WOULD REMAIN FOR BHUTTO. BHUTTO IS, HOWEVER, AN ADEPT POLITICIAN WHO MIGHT FIND SOME WAY OUT OF HIS PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

8. INDIAN INTERNAL SITUATION. WHEN ASKED ABOUT HIS READING OF THE SITUATION IN INDIA, AMBASSADOR YAQUB SAID THE SITUATION WAS UNPREDICTABLE BECAUSE OF THE MANY VARIABLES INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAD A REMARKABLE SUPPLENESS AND ABILITY TO ABSORB UNUSUAL SHOCKS, CONFIDENTIAL

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INCLUDING THOSE OF WIDESPREAD FAMINE AND HUNGER. YAQUB THEN PROCEEDED TO SPIN OUT A SCENARIO LEADING TO A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE SUBCONTINENT. ONE COULD ENVISAGE, HE SAID, A SITUATION DEVELOPING IN INDIA IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER. IN THIS CASE, IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE MILITARY WOULD FIND ITSELF IN A GOVERNING POSITION, EVEN THOUGH IT HAD NO INTENTION OF UNDERTAKING A COUP. WITH MILITARY RULE AND A CONDITION OF UNCERTAINTY, IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT WEST BENGAL AND ASSAM MIGHT BREAK AWAY FROM INDIA AND JOIN BANGLADESH IN A TERRITORIAL UNIT WHICH WOULD FALL UNDER CHINESE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE. IN THE MEANTIME, WEST INDIA MIGHT FALL UNDER THE DOMINATION OF THE USSR. GIVEN SUCH DEVELOPMENTS, AND AIDED WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY BY AFGHANISTAN, MOSCOW MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO STEP UP EFFORTS TO DRIVE TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF. AMBASSADOR YAQUB CONJECTURED THAT THE "BRENNPUNKT" OF WORLD AFFAIRS WOULD THEN SHIFT TO THE PERSIAN GULF. THE SOVIET UNION'S PRIMARY CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN WAS PAKISTAN'S CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. THE AMBASSADOR BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S LONG-RANGE GOAL TO ENCOURAGE A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE SUBCONTINENT OF SOUTH ASIA -- PERHAPS UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF A COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM -- WHICH WOULD BE RESISTANT TO THE EXPANSION OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA.

9. INDOCHINA. JUDGING BY STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM SAIGON, AMBASSADOR YAQUB FELT THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT COMMUNISM IN VIETNAM WOULD NOT BE "MONOLITHIC." ALTHOUGH MOSCOW MIGHT HAVE A MORE INFLUENTIAL POSITION IN HANOI - AT THE MOMENT BECAUSE OF ITS SUPPLY OF ARMS TO NORTH

VIETNAM, THE CHINESE BELIEVE THAT HANOI WILL EVENTUALLY  
GRAVITATE MORE TOWARD PEKING THAN MOSCOW BECAUSE OF  
GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND BECAUSE THE CHINESE MODEL OF  
COMMUNISM IS MORE PERTINENT TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

SITUATION THAN IS THE MODEL OFFERED BY THE SOVIET UNION.  
HE EXPRESSED BEWILDERMENT OVER THE CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF  
THE AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP AND SIMILAR PUZZLEMENT OVER THE  
NEW GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO EVACUATE CAMBODIANS FROM  
PHNOM PENH. AMBASSADOR YAQUB DOUBTED THAT NORTH AND SOUTH  
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VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA WOULD OPT FOR A NONALIGNED FOREIGN  
POLICY BECAUSE ALL WOULD BE HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON  
COMMUNIST STATES FOR SUPPORT. KISSINGER

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